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Abstract
In this contribution we explore choice revision, a sort of belief change in which
the new information is represented by a set of sentences and the agent could ac-
cept some of the sentences while rejecting the others. We propose a generalized
version of expansion operation called partial expansion for developing models
of choice revision. By using the partial expansion and two multiple contraction
operations previously introduced in the literature, we construct two kinds of
choice revision on belief bases. For each of them we propose a set of postulates
and prove a partial or full representation theorem. Furthermore, we investigate
the operations of making up one’s mind derived from these two kinds of choice
revision and also give the associated representation theorems.
Keywords: Choice revision, Partial expansion, Belief base, Multiple contrac-
tion, Making up one’s mind
1 Introduction
Choice revision1 is a sort of non-prioritized multiple belief revision. It has two
particular characteristics which make it distinctive from the standard AGM re-
vision [Alchourro´n et al., 1985]: multiple which means that in this belief change
the new information is represented by a set of sentences instead of a single sen-
tence, and non-prioritized which means that the new information has no priority
to the original beliefs, in other words, the agent could accept part of the new
information while rejecting the rest. As suggested by [Falappa et al., 2012], a
practical scenario of choice revision could be a multi-agent system in which a
computational agent receives independent information from other agents and
adds the most reliable part to her knowledge base.
Choice revsion is differrent from the “selective revision” introduced in Ferme
Hansson (1999). Selection revision is a also kind of non-prioritized revision,
but its inputs are sentences rather than sets of sentences. It is easy to see
that generally choice revision by a finite set A cannot be reduced to selective
revision by the conjunction &A of all elements in A: Selection revision ∗s is
postulated to satisfy extensionality, i.e. if ϕ is logically equivalent to ψ, then
that K ∗s ϕ = K ∗s ψ holds. However, though ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ is equivalent to ψ ∧ ¬ψ
1 This term is firstly introduced by [Fuhrmann, 1988]. To refer to the same concept,
[Rott, 2001] uses the terms “bunch revision” and “pick revision”, while [Falappa et al., 2012]
use the term “selective change”.
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for every sentences ϕ and ψ, it is possible that K ∗c {ϕ,¬ϕ} ≠K ∗c {ψ,¬ψ}, for
example, in the case of that ϕ and ψ are stating totally irrelevant things.
Choice revision is also different from the operation ofmerge [Fuhrmann, 1997,
Falappa et al., 2012], which is another mode of non-prioritized multiple revision.
In merge, the original beliefs and the new information are symmetrically treated.
So, it holds for any merge operator # that K#A = A#K for every sets K and
A. It follows that # does not in general satisfy the following success condition:
A∩(K#A) ≠ ∅ when A is non-empty. Otherwise, it would lead to an unaccept-
able consequence that {ϕ}#{¬ϕ} = {ϕ,¬ϕ} for every ϕ. However, as we will
show, choice revision could satisfy the above success condition without resulting
such unreasonable consequence.
Little work has been done on the formal properties of choice revision. An
initial study on this issue could be found in [Zhang, 2018], where a newly de-
veloped framework of belief change called descriptor revision [Hansson, 2013]
played an important role. As shown in [Zhang, 2018], it is difficult to model
choice revision in the traditional AGM framework since the select-and-intersect
method employed in this framework is not generally applicable. But instead the
descriptor revision which employs a select-direct methodology is workable. This
is also the reason why [Zhang and Hansson, 2015] used this new framework to
develop the modelling for the operation of making up one’s mind, which is a
belief change operation that takes the agent from a state in which she neither
believes in a sentence nor in its negation to a state in which she believes in one
of them. In the formal sense, choice revision is a generalization of the operation
of making up one’s mind, as the operator ∗∼ of making up one’s mind can be
reconstructed from choice revision operator ∗c in the way ofK∗∼ϕ =K∗c{ϕ,¬ϕ}.
Unfortunately, though descriptor revision is a so powerful tool (see [Hansson, 2017]
for a survey), it seems that the framework is only suitable for modelling belief
changes on belief sets, i.e. sets of sentences that are logically closed. To see this,
a quick review on the basics of descriptor revision is necessary.
In the framework of descriptor revision, a special kind of metalinguistic sen-
tences called descriptors are introduced for describing the success conditions of
belief changes. Descriptor revision operator ○ is a unified operator which applies
to all descriptors. More specifically, an atomic descriptor is a sentence Bϕ such
that ϕ is sentence from the object language and B is a metalinguistic operator.
A composite descriptor (descriptor for short) is a set of truth-functional com-
binations of atomic descriptors. The intended interpretation of Bϕ is “holding
belief ϕ”. So, a belief set X , which represents the whole set of beliefs held by
the agent of some belief state, satisfies Bϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ X . Conditions of
satisfaction for truth-functional combination of atomic descriptors are defined
inductively in the usual way, and a belief set satisfies a descriptor if and only if
it satisfies all its elements.
Furthermore, for the construction of ○, it assumes that there is an outcome
set X of potential outcomes of belief changes, and each belief change is performed
by a direct choice among these potential outcomes. So, for example, choice
revision ∗c can be constructed from descriptor revision ○ in the way of K ∗c
{ϕ0, ϕ1,⋯, ϕn} =K ○ {Bϕ0 ∨Bϕ1 ∨⋯∨Bϕn}, and the outcome of K ○ {Bϕ0 ∨
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Bϕ1 ∨ ⋯ ∨Bϕn} is the set selected directly from the elements of X satisfying
the descriptor {Bϕ0 ∨Bϕ1 ∨⋯∨Bϕn}.
Given the intended interpretation of B, only belief sets could be taken as
elements of the outcome set X. If elements in X are sets of sentences which are
not necessarily logically closed, i.e. belief bases,2 then descriptors will become
not appropriate for describing the success conditions of belief changes unless
the interpretation of the metalinguistic symbol B is correspondingly modified.
However, this modification seems not straightforward.
In this contribution, in order to model choice revision ∗c (and the derived
making up one’s mind operation ∗∼) on belief bases, we choose another strat-
egy rather than adapting the approach of descriptor revision to the context
of belief bases. The methodology employed here is inspired by the work in
[Hansson, 1993], where a package multiple revision3 is built up from two more
elementary units: a package multiple contraction and an expansion operation.
In this article, for the construction of choice revision on belief bases, in addition
to the package multiple contraction, we will also make use of the choice multi-
ple contraction proposed in [Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994]. Moreover, we will
propose a generalized expansion operation. With these building blocks in hand,
we can start to construct two sorts of choice revision on belief bases.
The rest of this contribution will be structured as follows. In Section 2,
we will present some formal preliminaries. In Section 3, we will present the
basics of package and choice multiple revision needed for the work in later
sections. Moreover, in this section, we will introduce the generalized expansion
operation mentioned above. In Section 4, we will show how to construct two
kinds of choice revision by using the tools previously introduced, and how to
axiomatically characterize these constructions. Following this, Section 5 will be
devoted to the study of the operations of making up one’s mind derived from
the two choice revision operations. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Let object language L be defined inductively from a set of propositional variables
{p0, p1, ⋯, pn, ⋯} and the truth-functional operations ¬,∧,∨, → and ↔. ⊺ is a
tautology and  a contradiction. Sentences in L will be denoted by lower-case
Greek letters and sets of such sentences by upper-case Roman letters.
Cn is a consequence operation for L satisfying supraclassicality (if ϕ can be
2 According to [Levi, 1977, Levi, 1991], a belief base K could be interpreted as the set
of statements the agent actually believes, and the corresponding belief set, i.e. the logi-
cal closure of K, should be interpreted as the set of statements that the agent is commit-
ted to believing. Also, the distinction between belief bases and belief sets has been re-
lated to the difference between foundationalist and coherentist viewpoints in epistemology
[Ga¨rdenfors, 1990, Sosa, 1980]. This article is not concerned with the issue of comparison
between belief base and belief set. For more discussion on this topic, see [Hansson, 1999], p.
17-24.
3 In package multiple revision, the new information is represented by a set of sentences
and the agent always incorporates the entire new information into her beliefs.
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derived from A by classical truth-functional logic, then ϕ ∈ Cn(A)), compactness
(if ϕ ∈ Cn(A), then there exists some finite B ⊆ A such that ϕ ∈ Cn(B)) and the
deduction property (ϕ ∈ Cn(A ∪ {ψ}) if and only if (henceforth “iff” for short)
ψ → ϕ ∈ Cn(A)). As we have mentioned, belief base is an arbitrary set A of
sentences, and a belief base A is a belief set iff A = Cn(A).
For sets of sentences A and B, A ⊢ B holds iff B ∩Cn(A) ≠ ∅, and A ⊩ B
holds iff B ⊆ Cn(A). We will omit the bracket of the set if it is singleton. For
example, we will write ϕ ⊢ ψ instead of {ϕ} ⊢ {ψ}.
A ≡ B holds iff for every ϕ ∈ A, there exists ψ ∈ B such that ∅ ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ and
vice versa. A is a quotient-finite set iff there is a finite set B such that A ≡ B.
K ⍊ A and K∠A respectively denote the package remainder set and choice
remainder set of K with respect to A, which are formally defined as follows:
Definition 1 ([Hansson, 1993]). X ∈K ⍊ A iff (i) X ⊆K, (ii) X ⊬ A, and (iii)
For all Y ⊆K, if X ⊂ Y , then Y ⊢ A.
Definition 2 ([Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994]). X ∈ K∠A iff (i) X ⊆ K, (ii)
X ⊮ A, and (iii) For all Y ⊆K, if X ⊂ Y , then Y ⊩ A.
A selection function γ is a binary function defined as follows:
Definition 3 ([Alchourro´n et al., 1985, Hansson, 1993, Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994]).
1. A selection function γ is any function γ ∶ P(L) × P(P(L)) → P(P(L))
such that ∅ ≠ γ(X,Y) ⊆ Y for all Y ≠ ∅, and γ(X,Y) = {X} otherwise.
2. A selection function γ is △-unified if and only if for all subsets K1, K2,
A1 and A2 of L: If K1 △ A1 = K2 △ A2 ≠ ∅, then ⋂γ(K1,K1 △ A1) =
⋂γ(K2,K2 △A2), where △ ∈ {∠,⍊}.
3 Tools for constructing choice revision
In this section, we exhibit the main components of which the choice revision
on belief bases constructed here consists. As we have mentioned, they in-
clude two kinds of multiple contraction operations: package multiple contraction
[Hansson, 1993] and choice multiple contraction [Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994],4
and a generalized version of expansion operation.
3.1 Package contraction and choice contraction
Like choice revision, both package contraction and choice contraction are mul-
tiple belief changes. It means that in the process of these two belief changes,
the questionable information is represented by a set of sentences. The differ-
ence is that in package contraction the agent should remove all the questionable
4 Henceforth call them “package contraction” and “choice contraction” for short.
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information, but in choice contraction the agent could remove its highly unbe-
lievable part and at same time keep the rest relatively plausible part. In what
follows, we perform a quick review of the formal properties of these two multiple
contraction operations.
Package contraction operator is formally defined in the following way:
Definition 4 ([Hansson, 1993]). An operator ÷p ∶ P(L) × P(L) → P(L) is a
package contraction iff there exists a selection function γ such that for every
sets K and A,
K ÷p A = ⋂γ(K,K ⍊ A).
Moreover, ÷p is unified iff γ is ⍊-unified.
It has been shown that package contraction (and unified package contraction)
can be axiomatically characterized with a set of plausible postulates.
Theorem 1 ([Hansson, 1993]).
1. ÷p is a package contraction iff it satisfies the following conditions: for all
sets K and A ,
K ÷p A ⊆K (÷p-inclusion).
If ∅ ⊬ A, then K ÷p A ⊬ A (÷p-success).
If it holds for all K ′ ⊆K that K ′ ⊢ A iff K ′ ⊢ B, then K÷pA =K÷pB
(÷p-uniformity).
If ϕ ∈K ∖K ÷pA, then there is some K ′ with K ÷pA ⊆K ′ ⊆K, such
that K ′ ⊬ A and K ′ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ A (÷p-relevance).
2. ÷p is unified iff it satisfies in addition the following:
If ∅ ⊬ A, and each element of Z implies an element of A, then
K ÷p A = (K ∪Z) ÷p A (÷p-redundancy).
Analogously, choice contraction is defined in terms of choice remainder sets
and selection functions as follows:
Definition 5 ([Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994, modified]). An operator ÷c ∶
P(L)×P(L)→ P(L) is a choice contraction iff there exists a selection function
γ such that for every sets K and A,
K ÷c A = ⋂γ(K,K∠A).
÷c is unified iff γ is ∠-unified.
There is a partial representation theorem for the operation of choice con-
traction on belief bases.
Theorem 2 ([Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994, modified]).
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1. ÷c is a choice contraction on belief bases with finite sets as inputs
5 iff it
satisfies the following conditions: for all set K and finite set A,
K ÷c A ⊆ A (÷c-inclusion).
If ∅ ⊮ A, then K ÷c A ⊮ A (÷c-success).
If it holds for all K ′ ⊆K that K ′ ⊩ A iff K ′ ⊩ B, then K÷cA =K÷cB
(∗c-uniformity).
If ϕ ∈K ∖K ÷cA, then there is some K ′ with K ÷cA ⊆K ′ ⊆K, such
that K ′ ⊮ A and K ′ ∪ {ϕ} ⊧ A (÷c-relevance).
2. ÷c is unified iff it satisfies in addition the following:
If ∅ ⊮ A, and each element of Z implies all elements of A, then
K ÷c A = (K ∪Z) ÷c A (÷c-redundancy).
Theorem 2 does not generally hold if we remove the restriction “with finite
sets as inputs”. For a counterexample, assume there is a set A of infinitely
atomic sentences p1, p2, p3,⋯ in the language L and let K = {p1, p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∧
p2 ∧ p3,⋯}. Let ÷c be any choice contraction on K. We can see that ÷c-
success is violated: It holds that ∅ ⊮ A, however, K∠A = ∅ and hence K =
K ÷cA ⊩ A. Nevertheless, [Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994] have shown that the
set of postulates in Theorem 2 axiomatically characterizes choice contractions
on belief sets with arbitrary inputs. To see why, we should first note that the
following upper bound property on package remainder set is indispensable for
the proof of Theorem 1.
Observation 1 ([Alchourro´n and Makinson, 1981, modified]). Let K be a belief
base. For every K ′ ⊆ K, if K ′ ⊬ A, then there exists some set X such that
K ′ ⊆X and X ∈K ⍊ A.
Similarly, the following result on choice remainder set is needed for the proof
of Theorem 2.
Observation 2. Let K be a belief base and A a quotient-finite set. For every
K ′ ⊆ K, if K ′ ⊮ A, then there exists some set X such that K ′ ⊆ X and X ∈
K∠A.
Proof for Observation 2: Let A be a quotient-finite set, then there is a finite set
B such that A ≡ B. Moreover, let K ′ ⊆ K and let K ′ ⊮ A. It follows from
K ′ ⊮ A that A ≠ ∅. So B is not empty neither. Hence, for every X ⊆ L, X ⊮ A
holds iff X ⊮ B holds iff X ⊬ &B holds, where &B is the conjunction of all
propositions contained in B. It follows that K ′ ⊬ &B and K ⍊ {&B} = K∠A.
Moreover, by Observation 1, it follows from K ′ ⊬ &B and K ′ ⊆ K that there
exists some set X such that K ′ ⊆ X and X ∈ K ⍊ {&B}. Thus, there exists
some set X such that K ′ ⊆X and X ∈K∠A.
5 In what follows, we will denote contraction/revision operator with a restricted domain,
say K×X, where both K and X are subsets of P(L), by contraction/revision on such and such
sets (i.e. K) with such and such inputs (i.e. A).
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A choice remainder set K∠A does not generally have the upper bound prop-
erty if we drop the condition that A is quotient-finite. To see this, just let K
and A be same as those in the previous example and let K ′ = {p1}, then K ′ ⊮ A
but since K∠A = ∅ there is no X ∈K∠A such that K ′ ⊆X . This fact explains
the reason why Theorem 2 cannot hold in general. By contrast, given that K
is logically closed, it holds for every set A that K∠A has the upper bound
property,6 which is necessary for proving that the postulates in Theorem 2 can
exactly characterize all the choice contractions on belief sets.
3.2 Partial expansion
Comparing with revision and contraction, the construction of expansion opera-
tion + is of a simpler form:
K +A = Cn(K ∪A)
for expansion on belief sets, or
K +A =K ∪A
for expansion on belief bases.
Here we generalize the expansion operation to a non-prioritized version
named partial expansion, in which the agent could be expanding her set of
beliefs with a part of the new information as well as dismissing the remaining.
Before introducing the formal definition of partial expansion, we first define the
notion of partial sum set K ⋈A as follows:
Definition 6. X ∈K ⋈A iff (i) X ⊆ (K ∪A), (ii) K ⊆X, and (iii) X ∩A ≠ ∅.
We observe that a partial sum set K ⋈A is not identical to any package or
choice remainder set, except in the limiting case of that K ⋈A is a singleton.
Observation 3. If K1 ⋈ A ≠ ∅ and there exist K2 and B such that K1 ⋈A =
K2 ⍊ B or K1 ⋈A =K2∠B, then K1 ⋈A is a singleton.
Proof for Observation 3: Suppose towards contradiction that K1 ⋈ A is not a
singleton. It follows from K1 ⋈A ≠ ∅ that A contains two distinct sentences ϕ
and ψ, of which at least one is not in K. By the definition of ⋈, both K1 ∪ {ϕ}
and K1 ∪ {ϕ,ψ} belong to K1 ⋈ A. However, it is easy to see that there is no
any package or choice remainder set which could contain both K1 ∪ {ϕ} and
K1 ∪ {ϕ,ψ}. Thus, K1 ⋈A is a singleton.
Next we define the following selection functions with respect to partial sum
sets:
6 [Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994] did not explicitly prove this result. It is not difficult to
see that it follows from Observation 1 and an observation given in [Alchourro´n et al., 1985]:
If K is a belief set and X ∈ K ⍊ {ϕ}, then X ∈ K ⍊ {ψ} for every ψ ∈ K ∖X. The detailed
proof is left to the reader.
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Definition 7. Let γ be a selection function.
1. γ is ⋈-choice-full iff γ(K,K ⋈ A) = K ⋈ A for all K and A such that
K ⋈A ≠ ∅.
2. γ is ⋈-unified iff for all K1, K2, A1 and A2: If K1 ⋈ A1 = K2 ⋈ A2 ≠ ∅,
then ⋃γ(K1,K1 ⋈A1) = ⋃γ(K2,K2 ⋈A2).
3. γ is ⋈-consistency-preserved iff for all K and A: If there exists a set
X ∈K ⋈A such that X ⊬ , then ⋃γ(K,K ⋈A) ⊬ .
Now a range of partial expansion operations can be defined in terms of such
selection functions.
Definition 8 (Partial expansion). An operator +˙ ∶ P(L) × P(L) → P(L) is a
partial expansion iff there exists a selection function γ such that for every sets
K and A,
K+˙A = ⋃γ(K,K ⋈A).
+˙ is choice-full, unified or consistency-preserved iff γ is ⋈-choice-full, ⋈-unified
or ⋈-consistency-preserved respectively.
Partial expansion on belief sets can be defined in almost the same way:
K+˙A = Cn(⋃γ(K,K ⋈A)).
It is easy to see that the normal expansion operation is a special case of partial
expansion, namely the choice-full partial expansion. Moreover, it follows imme-
diately from the following observation that all partial expansions are unified.
Observation 4. All selection functions are ⋈-unified.
Proof for Observation 4: It is enough to show that if K1 ⋈A = K2 ⋈B ≠ ∅ and
K1 ≠K2, then both K1 ⋈A and K2 ⋈B are singletons. Suppose A∩K1 ≠ ∅ and
B∩K2 ≠ ∅. Then, K1 ∈K1⋈A. So, by our assumption that K1⋈A =K2⋈B ≠ ∅,
K1 ∈ K2 ⋈ B whence K2 ⊆ K1. So K2 ⊂ K1 since K1 ≠ K2. Similarly, it can
be shown that K2 ⊂ K1, which leads to a contradiction. So it holds that either
A ∩ K1 = ∅ or B ∩ K2 = ∅. Without loss of generality, let us assume that
A∩K1 = ∅. Suppose K1⋈A ≠ ∅ is not a singleton, then there exist two distinct
sentences ϕ and ψ in A. It follows that K1∪{ϕ} ∈K1⋈A and K1∪{ψ} ∈K1⋈A.
So K1 ∪ {ϕ} ∈ K2 ⋈ B and K1 ∪ {ψ} ∈ K1 ⋈ B since K1 ⋈ A = K2 ⋈ B. So
K2 ⊆ K1 ∪ {ϕ} and K2 ⊆ K1 ∪ {ψ}, whence K2 ⊆ K1. But K1 ≠ K2, then
K2 ⊂ K1. Moreover, it follows from K1 ⋈ A = K2 ⋈ B that ϕ ∈ K2 ∪ B. So
ϕ ∈ B, since K2 ⊂ K1 and ϕ ∈ A which is disjoint with K1. It follows that
K2 ∪ {ϕ} ∈ K2 ⋈B, whence K2 ∪ {ϕ} ∈ K1 ⋈A. However, it is easy to see that
K1 /⊆K2 ∪ {ϕ}, which leads to a contradiction. Thus, both K1 ⋈A and K2 ⋈B
are singletons.
An axiomatic characterization of partial expansion is obtainable with a set
of postulates of the following simple forms:
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Theorem 3 (Representation theorem for partial expansion).
1. +˙ is a partial expansion iff it satisfies the following postulates:
K+˙A ⊆K ∪A (+˙-inclusion).
K ⊆K+˙A (+˙-preservation).
If A ≠ ∅, then A ∩ (K+˙A) ≠ ∅ (+˙-success).
If K∩A ≠ ∅ and A ⊆ B ⊆ (K∪A), then K+˙A =K+˙B (+˙-coincidence).
2. +˙ is consistency-preserved iff it in addition satisfies:
If there exists X such that K ⊆ X ⊆ (K ∪ A) and X ⊬ , then
K+˙A ⊬  (+˙-consistency).
See appendix for the proofs of this and other representation theorems.
4 Constructing choice revision
Now we turn to the construction of choice revision ∗c on belief bases. Besides
the operations discussed in the previous section, the following construction of
negation set will also be used.
Definition 9 ([Hansson, 1993, modified7]). Let A be some set of sentences.
Then the negation set n(A) of A is defined as follows:
1. n(∅) = ⊺,
2. n(A) = ⋃
n≥1
{¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2 ∨⋯∨ ¬ϕn ∣ ϕi ∈ A for every i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Negation set extends the notion of negation of sentence. It is obvious that
n(A) is quotient-finite when A is finite.
In what follows, two kinds of choice revision operators on belief bases will be
constructed, namely internal choice revision and external choice revision. These
two terms are based on the terminology used in [Hansson, 1993] for package
multiple revision.
4.1 Internal choice revision
Definition 10 (Internal choice revision). An operator ∗c ∶ P(L) × P(L) →
P(L) is an internal choice revision iff there exists a choice contraction ÷c and
a consistency-preserving partial expansion +˙ such that for every sets K and A,
K ∗c A =K ÷c n(A)+˙A.
∗c is unified iff +˙ and ÷c are unified.
7 In the original definition of negation set, n(∅) is defined as  instead of ⊺. We modify
it since it is intuitive to let K ∗c A = K in the limiting case of that A = ∅. This would be
easily realized if we use the modified definition of negation set.
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The intuitive meaning of Definition 10 is that the process of belief change
of choice revision could be decomposed into two steps: In order to revise K
to incorporate some subset of the new information A, the agent could first
contract K by a set of sentences which contradicts some part of A, then expand
the contracted belief base with a subset of A which is consistent with it.
Although the procedure of internal choice revision is divided into two seemly
independent steps, we observe that every internal choice revision can be recon-
structed by a single selection function.
Observation 5. ∗c is an internal choice revision iff there exists a ⋈-consistency
preserving selection function γ such that:
K ∗c A = ⋃γ(⋂γ(K,K∠n(A)), (⋂γ(K,K∠n(A)))⋈A).
Moreover, ∗c is unified iff γ is ∠-unified.
Proof for Observation 5: It follows immediately from the definitions of opera-
tions used in the construction of internal choice revision, and Observations 3
and 4.
The following observation tells us that if the original belief base K is consis-
tent, then the overlapping parts of K and the new information A will be kept
in the outcome of choice contraction ÷c on K by the negation set n(A) of A.
Observation 6. Let ÷c be a choice contraction. If K is consistent, then K∩A ⊆
K ÷c n(A) for every A.
Proof for Observation 6: Suppose towards contradiction that there exists ϕ such
that ϕ ∈K ∩A and ϕ ∉K ÷c n(A). By ϕ ∈K and the definition of ÷c, it follows
from ϕ ∉ K ÷c n(A) that there exists X ∈ K∠n(A) such that ϕ ∉ X . Since
ϕ ∈ K ∩ A, by the definition of choice remainder, X ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ¬ϕ and hence
X ⊢ ¬ϕ. So K ⊢ ¬ϕ. But it contradicts that ϕ ∈K and K is consistent. Thus,
K ∩A ⊆K ÷c n(A).
So, suppose that ∗c is an internal choice revision based on some choice
contraction ÷c and some partial expansion, it is not difficult to observe that ∗c
has the following property:
Observation 7. Let ÷c be a choice contraction and ∗c an internal choice revi-
sion based on ÷c. If K is consistent, then K ∩ (K ∗c A) = K ÷c n(A) for every
A.
Proof for Observation 7: By ÷c-inclusion and +˙-inclusion, K ÷c n(A) ⊆ K and
K ÷c n(A) ⊆K ÷c n(A)+˙A =K ∗cA, so K ÷c n(A) ⊆K ∩(K ∗cA). For the other
inclusion direction, K ∩ (K ∗c A) =K ∩ (K ÷c n(A)+˙A) ⊆K ∩ (K ÷c n(A)∪A),
whence K ∩ (K ∗c A) ⊆ (K ∩ (K ÷c n(A)) ∪ (K ∩A) = (K ÷c n(A)) ∪ (K ∩A).
By Observation 6, K ∩ A ⊆ K ÷c n(A) when K is consistent. It follows that
K ∩ (K ∗c A) ⊆ K ÷c n(A). Thus, K ∩ (K ∗c A) ⊆ K ÷c n(A) when K is
consistent.
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Observation 7 together with Theorems 2 and 3 hint that we can provide
an axiomatic characterization for a restricted variant of internal choice revision
with the following postulates:
Theorem 4 (Partial representation theorem for internal choice revision).
1. ∗c is an internal choice revision on consistent belief bases with finite inputs
iff it satisfies the following conditions: for every consistent K and finite
A and B,
K ∗c A ⊆ (K ∪A) (∗c-inclusion).
If A ≠ ∅, then A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅ (∗c-success).
K ∗c A = (K ∩ (K ∗c A)) ∗c A (∗c-iteration).
If A /≡ {⊥}, then K ∗c A ⊬  (∗c-consistency).
If A ∩ K ≠ ∅ and A ⊆ B ⊆ (A ∪ K), then K ∗c A = K ∗c B (∗c-
coincidence).
If it holds for all K ′ ⊆ K that K ′ ∪ {ϕ} ⊬  for some ϕ ∈ A iff
K ′ ∪ {ψ} ⊬  for some ψ ∈ B, then K ∩ (K ∗c A) = K ∩ (K ∗c B)
(∗c-uniformity).
If ϕ ∈K ∖K ∗cA, then there is some K ′ with K ∩(K ∗cA) ⊆K ′ ⊆K,
such that K ′ ∪ {ψ} ⊬  for some ψ ∈ A and K ′ ∪ {ϕ} ∪ {λ} ⊢  for
every λ ∈ A (∗c-relevance).
2. ∗c is additionally unified iff it satisfies in addition the following:
If K∪Z ⊬ , A /≡ {⊥}, A ≠ ∅ and it holds for every ϕ ∈ Z that ϕ ⊢ ¬ψ
for all ψ ∈ A , then K ∗c A = (K ∪Z) ∗c A (∗c-redundancy).
With the exception of ∗c-iteration, each of these postulates corresponds to
one of the postulates that characterize choice contraction or partial expansion.
According to ∗c-iteration, let K
′ be the remaining part of K after performing an
internal choice revision on K, then performing again the choice revision on K ′
will generate the same outcome as performing the choice revision on K. This is
in conformity with the “first contract, then expand” process of the belief change
of internal choice revision.
4.2 External choice revision
In this subsection, we investigate an alternative construction of choice revision
on belief bases. Generally speaking, this construction originates from the idea
that we can reverse the procedure of internal choice revision: In order to revise
K to take some sentences in A, the agent could first properly expand the K
with a subset A′ of A, then contract the negation set n(A′) of A′. This method-
ology is not workable in the context of belief sets, since it typically involves a
temporary inconsistent belief state, and different inconsistent belief states can-
not be distinguished by the only one inconsistent belief set, i.e. Cn({}). The
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choice revision constructed in this approach is called external choice revision.
Formally, it is defined as follow:
Definition 11 (External choice revision). An operator ∗c ∶ P(L)×P(L)→ P(L)
is an external choice revision iff there exists a package contraction ÷p and a
partial expansion +˙ such that for all K and A,
K ∗c A =K+˙A ÷p n(A
′)
where A′ = (K+˙A) ∖K. Moreover, ∗c is unified iff +˙ and ÷p are unified.
Similar to choice revision, we observe that every external choice revision can
be reconstructed from a single selection function.
Observation 8. ∗c is an external choice revision iff there exists a selection
function γ such that:
K ∗c A = ⋂γ(⋃γ(K,K ⋈A), (⋃γ(K,K ⋈A)) ⍊ n(A
′)),
where A′ = (⋃γ(K,K ⋈A)) ∖K. Moreover, ∗c is unified iff γ is ⍊-unified.
Proof for Observation 8: It follows immediately from the definitions of opera-
tions used in the construction of external choice revision, and Observations 3
and 4.
For axiomatization of external choice revision, we first prove the following
observation, which plays a role for external choice revision similar to that Ob-
servation 7 plays for internal choice revision.
Observation 9. Let +˙ be a partial expansion, ÷p a package contraction and ∗c
the external choice revision generated from them. Then,
1. (K+˙A) ∖K = (K ∗c A) ∖K;
2. (K ∗c A) ∪K =K+˙A.
Proof for Lemma 9: 1. Let A′ = (K+˙A) ∖K. Since K ∗c A = (K+˙A) ÷p n(A′),
K ∗c A ⊆ K+˙A by ÷p-inclusion. So (K ∗c A) ∖ K ⊆ A′ by basic set theory.
Since A′ ∩K = ∅, in order to complete the proof, we only need to prove that
A′ ⊆ K ∗c A. If A′ = ∅, it holds trivially. If A′ ≠ ∅, we should consider two
cases. (i) A′ is inconsistent. In this case, (K+˙A) ⍊ n(A′) = ∅. So K ∗c A =
(K+˙A)÷pn(A′) =K+˙A and hence A′ ⊆K∗cA. (ii) A′ is consistent. In this case,
(K+˙A) ⍊ n(A′) ≠ ∅. We should show that A′ ⊆X for everyX ∈ (K+˙A) ⍊ n(A′).
Suppose towards contradiction that there exists X ∈ (K+˙A) ⍊ n(A′) such that
A′ /⊆ X , i.e. there exists ϕ such that ϕ ∈ A′ and ϕ ∉ X . Then X,ϕ ⊢ n(A′)
by the definition of package remainder set. It follows from the definition of
negation set that there exist β1,⋯, βn ∈ A such that X,ϕ ⊢ ¬β1 ∨ ⋯βn. So, by
the deduction property, X ⊢ ϕ → (¬β1 ∨ ⋯βn), i.e. X ⊢ ¬ϕ ∨ ¬β1 ∨ ⋯βn. It
follows that X ⊢ n(A′) since ϕ ∈ A. However, it contradicts that X ⊬ n(A′) as
X ∈ (K+˙A) ⍊ n(A′). Thus, A′ = (K+˙A) ∖K = (K ∗c A) ∖K.
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2. It follows from (K+˙A) ∖K = (K ∗c A) ∖K that (K ∗c A) ∪K = ((K ∗c A) ∖
K)∪K = ((K+˙A)∖K)∪K. Since K ⊆K+˙A, ((K+˙A)∖K)∪K =K+˙A. Thus,
(K ∗c A) ∪K =K+˙A.
So, as suggested by the representation theorems on package contraction and
partial expansion, we can show that external choice revision can be axiomatically
characterize by the following postulates.
Theorem 5 (Representation theorem for external choice revision).
1. ∗c is an external choice revision iff it satisfies the following conditions:
for all K, K1, K2, A and B,
K ∗c A ⊆ (K ∪A) (∗c-inclusion).
If A ≠ ∅, then A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅ (∗c-success).
If (A ∩ (K ∗c A)) ⊆K, then K ∗c A =K (∗c-confirmation).
If (K ∗c A) ∖K ≠ ∅ and (K ∗c A) ∖K ⊬ , then K ∗c A ⊬  (∗c-
Consistency).
If A ∩ K ≠ ∅ and A ⊆ B ⊆ (A ∪ K), then K ∗c A = K ∗c B (∗c-
coincidence).
If K1 ≠ ((K1∗cA)∪K1) =K = ((K2∗cB)∪K2) ≠K2 and it holds for
all K ′ ⊆K that K ′∪((K1∗cA)∖K1) ⊬  iff K ′∪((K2∗cB)∖K2) ⊬ ,
then K1 ∗c A =K2 ∗c B (∗c-Uniformity).
If ϕ ∈ K ∖K ∗c A, then there is some K ′ with K ∗c A ⊆ K ′ ⊆ K ∪
(K ∗c A), such that K ′ ⊬  and K ′ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢  (∗c-Relevance).
2. ∗c is additionally unified iff it satisfies in addition the following:
If it holds for all X ⊆ L that X ⊆K1∪(K1 ∗cA) and X ∪((K1∗cA)∖
K1) is consistent iff X ⊆ K2 ∪ (K2 ∗c B) and X ∪ ((K2 ∗c B) ∖K2)
is consistent, then K1 ∗c A =K2 ∗c B. (∗c-strong Uniformity).
Only ∗c-confirmation has no correspondent in the set of postulates which
characterizes package contraction or partial expansion. The justification of ∗c-
confirmation is that if the part of the new information which the agent thinks
plausible and intends to accept is already in the her original belief state, then
nothing needs to be done to incorporate it. If ∗c is the sort of internal choice
revision discussed in Theorem 4, then ∗c also satisfies ∗c-confirmation: K ∗cA ⊆
K follows immediately from ∗c-inclusion, and K ⊆ K ∗c A follows immediately
from ∗c-relevance under the condition that K is consistent.
The following two examples confirm that internal choice revision and external
choice revision are indeed different operations: Let p, q and r be pairwise distinct
atomic propositions,
Example 1: Let K = {p,¬q,¬r} and A = {q, r}. So K∠n(A) = {{p,¬q},
{p,¬r}}. Let γ be some selection function satisfying that
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γ(K,K∠n(A)) = K∠n(A) and γ({p},{p} ⋈ A) = {{p, q}} and let ∗c be
the internal choice revision derived from γ. Then, K ∗c A = {p, q}. It is
easy to check that ∗c does not satisfy ∗c-Relevance. So, by Theorem 5, ∗c
is not an external choice revision.
Example 2: Let K = {q} and A = {p, p → ¬q}. Let γ be some selection
function satisfying that γ(K,K ⋈ A) = K ⋈ A and let ∗c be the external
choice revision derived from γ. Note that (K∪A) ⍊ n(A) = {{p, p→ ¬q}}.
It follows that K ∗c A = {p, p → ¬q}. It is easy to see that ∗c does not
satisfy ∗c-relevance. Moreover, K is consistent and A is finite. So, by
Theorem 4, ∗c is not an internal choice revision.
5 Constructing making up one’s mind
As we have mentioned, the operation of making up one’s mind can be con-
structed from choice revision in a straightforward way. So, two sorts of making
up one’s mind operations are naturally generated from the internal and external
choice revision as follows.
Definition 12 (Making up one’s mind).
1. An operation ∗∼ ∶ P(L)×L→ P(L) is a (unified) internal making up one’s
mind operation iff there exists a (unified) internal choice revision ∗c such
that for every set K and sentence ϕ,
K∗∼ϕ =K ∗c {ϕ,¬ϕ}.
2. An operation ∗∼ ∶ P(L)×L → P(L) is a (unified) external external making
up one’s mind operation iff there exists a (unified) external choice revision
∗c such that for every set K and sentence ϕ,
K∗∼ϕ =K ∗c {ϕ,¬ϕ}.
Also, we can obtain the following representation theorems for these two
generated making up one’s mind operations. Note that though we only provide
a partial representation theorem for internal choice revision, a full representation
theorem for internal making up one’s mind operation is obtainable.
Theorem 6 (Representation theorem for internal making up one’s mind).
1. ∗∼ is an internal making up one’s mind operation iff it satisfies the following
conditions:
K∗∼ϕ ⊆ (K ∪ {ϕ, ¬ϕ}) (∗∼-inclusion).
ϕ ∈K∗∼ϕ or ¬ϕ ∈K∗∼ϕ (∗∼-success).
 ∉K∗∼ϕ (∗c-consistency).
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If K ⊬ , {ϕ,¬ϕ} ∩ K ≠ ∅, {ψ,¬ψ} ∩ K ≠ ∅ and K ∪ {ϕ,¬ϕ} =
K ∪ {ψ,¬ψ}, then K∗∼ϕ =K∗∼ψ (∗∼-coincidence).
K∗∼ϕ = ((K∗∼⊺) ∩K)∗∼ϕ (∗∼-iteration).
If ψ ∈ K ∖K∗∼ϕ, then there is some K ′ with (K∗∼⊺) ∩K ⊆ K ′ ⊆ K,
such that K ′ ⊬  and K ′ ∪ {ψ} ⊢  (∗∼-relevance).
2. ∗∼ is additionally unified iff it satisfies in addition the following:
If Z ≡ {⊥}, then K∗∼ϕ = (K ∪Z)∗∼ϕ (∗∼-redundancy).
Theorem 7 (Representation theorem for external making up one’s mind).
1. ∗∼ is an external making up mind operation iff it satisfies the following
conditions:
K∗∼ϕ ⊆ (K ∪ {ϕ, ¬ϕ}) (∗∼-inclusion).
ϕ ∈K∗∼ϕ or ¬ϕ ∈K∗∼ϕ (∗∼-success).
If ({ϕ,¬ϕ} ∩ (K∗∼ϕ)) ⊆K, then K∗∼ϕ =K (∗∼-confirmation).
If (K∗∼ϕ)∖K ≠ ∅ and (K∗∼ϕ)∖K ⊬ , then K∗∼ϕ ⊬  (∗∼-Consistency).
If {ϕ,¬ϕ} ∩K ≠ ∅, {ψ,¬ψ} ∩K ≠ ∅ and K ∪ {ϕ,¬ϕ} =K ∪ {ψ,¬ψ},
then K∗∼ϕ =K∗∼ψ (∗∼-Coincidence).
If K1 ≠ ((K1∗∼ϕ) ∪K1) = K = ((K2∗∼ψ) ∪K2) ≠ K2 and it holds for
all K ′ ⊆K that K ′ ∪ ((K1∗∼ϕ)∖K1) ⊢  iff K ′ ∪ ((K2∗∼ψ)∖K2) ⊢ 
, then K1∗
∼ϕ =K2∗∼ψ (∗c-Uniformity).
If ψ ∈K ∖K∗∼ϕ, then there is some K ′ with K∗∼ϕ ⊆K ′ ⊆K ∪(K∗∼ϕ),
such that K ′ ⊢  and K ′ ∪ {ψ} ⊬  (∗∼-Relevance).
2. ∗∼ is additionally unified iff it satisfies in addition the following:
If it holds for all X ⊆ L that X ⊆ K1 ∪ (K1∗∼ϕ) and X ∪ ((K1∗∼ϕ) ∖
K1) ⊢  iff X ⊆ K2 ∪ (K2∗∼ψ) and X ∪ ((K2∗∼ψ) ∖K2) ⊢ , then
K1∗
∼ϕ =K2∗∼ψ (∗∼-strong Uniformity).
The difference between the internal and the external making up one’s mind
operations can be shown by using the following two examples: Let p1, p2, p3 be
pairwise distinct atomic propositions,
Example 3: Let K ′ = A = {p1,¬p1} and let ∗c be any internal choice
revision. Moreover, let ∗∼ be the internal making up one’s mind derived
from ∗c. By the construction of internal choice revision, it is easy to see
that either K∗∼p1 =K ∗cA = {p1} or K∗∼p1 =K ∗cA = {¬p1}. So ∗∼ cannot
coincide with any external making up one’s mind operation since it vio-
lates that ∗∼-confirmation.
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Example 4: Let K = {p1, p2} and let γ be some selection function sat-
isfying that ⋃γ(K,K ⋈ {p3,¬p3}) = K ∪ {p3,¬p3} and let ∗c be exter-
nal choice revision derived from γ. Then, the external making up one’s
mind operation ∗∼ derived from ∗c is not an internal choice revision since
K∗∼p3 =K ∗c {p3,¬p3} =K ∪ {p3,¬p3} which violates ∗∼-consistency.
The last example seemly also suggests that, as a modelling for the operation
of making up one’s mind, the internal making up one’s mind operators are better
than the external operators since the latter violates ∗∼-consistency. Intuitively,
to making up one’s mind about a sentence ϕ is usually understood as to accept
either ϕ or ¬ϕ. Accepting both ϕ and ¬ϕ, just like neither believing ϕ nor
believing ¬ϕ, reflects that the agent has not made a decision between ϕ and ¬ϕ.
6 Conclusions
In this article we investigated the formal properties of choice revision,
a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision, in the context of belief bases. We
presented constructions of two families of choice revision operators, namely in-
ternal choice revision and external choice revision. The constructions are based
on two multiple contraction operations already known in the literature and a
generalized expansion operation first introduced in this article. This approach
to choice revision is different from the method employed in [Zhang, 2018], where
the choice revision is modelled by descriptor revision. We have indicated that,
at least in its original form, descriptor revision is not suitable for modelling
belief changes on belief bases.
Also, we investigated the axiomatic characterizations of the constructed
choice revision. For internal choice revision, we provided a partial representation
theorem (Theorem 4) for the subset of this kind of operators on consistent belief
bases with finite sets as inputs. For external choice revision, a full representa-
tion theorem (Theorem 5) was obtained. Furthermore, we studied two sorts of
making up one’s mind operators derived from these two choice revision oper-
ators and also proved the corresponding representation theorems (Theorems 6
and 7).
For future work, we want to extend Theorems 2 and 4 to cover the general
case. Furthermore, properties of choice revision operators generated from se-
lection functions with more relational constraints, such as those proposed by
[Alchourro´n et al., 1985], remain to investigate. Finally, since the method of
construction of internal choice revision is also applicable to operations on belief
sets, it is interesting to study the difference and connection between the inter-
nal choice revision on belief sets and the choice revision modelled by descriptor
revision.
Appendix: proofs
We first give a lemma which is useful in the later proofs.
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Lemma 1. Let +˙ be a partial expansion operator and ∗c a choice revision op-
erator.
1. +˙ satisfies +˙-coincidence iff it satisfies:
If A ∩K ≠ ∅, B ∩K ≠ ∅ and K ∪ A = K ∪ B, then K+˙A = K+˙B
(+˙-Coincidence).
2. ∗c satisfies ∗c-coincidence iff it satisfies:
If A ∩K ≠ ∅, B ∩K ≠ ∅ and K ∪A = K ∪B, then K ∗c A = K ∗c B
(∗c-Coincidence).
3. If ∗c satisfies ∗c-inclusion and ∗c-relevance, then it satisfies:
If A = ∅, then K ∗c A =K (∗c-vacuity).
4. If ∗c satisfies ∗c-consistency and ∗c-relevance, then it satisfies:
If K ∗c A ⊢ , then K ⊆ (K ∗c A) (∗c-preservation).
5. If ∗c satisfies ∗c-Relevance, then it satisfies ∗c-preservation.
Proof for Lemma 1: 1. From left to right: Let A ∩ K ≠ ∅, B ∩ K ≠ ∅ and
K ∪A =K ∪B. Then, it follows that A ⊆ A∪B ⊆K ∪A and B ⊆ A∪B ⊆K ∪B.
So, by +˙-coincidence, K+˙A = K+˙(A ∪ B) = K+˙B. From right to left: Let
K ∩A ≠ ∅ and A ⊆ B ⊆K ∪A. Then, it follows immediately that K ∩B ≠ ∅ and
K ∪A =K ∪B. So, by +˙-Coincidence, K+˙A =K+˙B.
2. Similar to the proof for the equivalence between +˙-coincidence and +˙-Coincidence.
3. The from left to right inclusion direction follows immediately from ∗c-
inclusion and the other inclusion direction follows immediately from ∗c-relevance.
4. Let K ∗cA ⊢ , then A ≡ {} by ∗c-consistency. Suppose towards contradic-
tion that K∖(K∗cA) ≠ ∅, then, by ∗c-relevance, there exists some K ′ such that
K ′ ∪ {ϕ} ⊬  for some ϕ ∈ A. It contradicts that A ≡ {}. Thus, K ⊆ (K ∗c A).
5. Let K ∗cA ⊢ . Suppose towards contradiction that K ∖ (K ∗cA) ≠ ∅, then,
by ∗c-Relevance, there exists some K
′ such that K ∗c A ⊆ K ′ and K ′ ⊬ . It
contradicts that K ∗c A ⊢ . Thus, K ⊆ (K ∗c A).
Proof for Theorem 3: 1. From left to right: Trivial. From right to left: Let us
define a selection function γ in the following way:
(i) γ(K,Y) =K, if Y is empty;
(ii) γ(K,Y) = {X ∈ Y ∣ X ⊆ K+˙A}, if there is some non-empty A such that
Y =K ⋈A;
(iii) γ(K,Y) = Y, otherwise.
We need to show that:
(1) γ is well-defined, i.e. if X = Y, then γ(K,X) = γ(K,Y);
(2) γ(K,Y) =K if Y = ∅, which is immediate from the definition;
(3) γ(K,Y) ⊆ Y if Y ≠ ∅, which is also immediate from the definition;
(4) γ(K,Y) ≠ ∅ if Y ≠ ∅; and
(5) K+˙A = ⋃γ(K,K ⋈A).
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For (1) we only need to show that if K ⋈ A = K ⋈B ≠ ∅, then γ(K,K ⋈A) =
γ(K,K ⋈B). If A ∩K = ∅, it is immediate from K ⋈ A = K ⋈B that A = B.
So K+˙A = K+˙B, whence γ(K,K ⋈ A) = γ(K,K ⋈ B). On the other hand, if
A ∩K ≠ ∅, then K ∈ K ⋈ A. So K ∈ K ⋈ B and hence B ∩K ≠ ∅. Moreover,
it follows from K ⋈A = K ⋈B that K ∪A = K ∪ B. So, by +˙-coincidence and
Lemma 1, it holds that K+˙A =K+˙B, whence γ(K,K ⋈A) = γ(K,K ⋈B).
For (4), it is enough to show that γ(K,K ⋈ A) ≠ ∅ if A is non-empty. Let
A ≠ ∅, it follows immediately from +˙-inclusion, +˙-preservation and +˙-success
that K+˙A ∈K ⋈A. So γ(K,K ⋈A) = {X ∈K ⋈A ∣X ⊆K+˙A} ≠ ∅.
As to (5), we first consider the case A = ∅. It follows from A = ∅ that K⋈A = ∅.
So, by the definition of γ, ⋃γ(K,K ⋈ A) = K. Moreover, by +˙-inclusion and
+˙-preservation, it follows from A = ∅ that K+˙A =K. So ⋃γ(K,K ⋈A) =K+˙A.
For the principle case A ≠ ∅, as we have shown that K+˙A ∈K ⋈A when A ≠ ∅,
it follows immediately that ⋃γ(K,K ⋈A) = ⋃{X ∈K ⋈A ∣X ⊆K+˙A} =K+˙A.
2. From left to right: Trivial. From right to left: Define the selection func-
tion γ in the same way as that in the proof for the first part. We omit checking
the details.
Proof for Theorem 4: 1. From left to right: Let ∗c be an internal choice re-
vision on consistent belief bases with finite sets as inputs, i.e. there exist a
consistency-preserving partial expansion +˙ and a package contraction ÷p such
that for every consistent K and finite A, K ∗c A =K ÷c n(A)+˙A.
∗c-inclusion: By +˙-inclusion, K ÷c n(A)+˙A ⊆ (K ÷c n(A)) ∪ A. Moreover,
K ÷c n(A) ⊆K by ÷c-inclusion. Thus, K ∗c A =K ÷c n(A)+˙A ⊆K ∪A.
∗c-success: It follows immediately from +˙-success and the definition of internal
choice revision.
∗c-iteration: It is easy to see that (K ÷c A) ÷c A = K ÷c A for every A.
So, K ∗c A = K ÷c n(A)+˙A = (K ÷c n(A)) ÷c n(A)+˙A. By Observation 7,
(K ÷c n(A)) ÷c n(A)+˙A = (K ∩ (K ∗c A)) ÷c A+˙A. Thus, K ∗c A = (K ∩ (K ∗c
A)) ÷c A+˙A = (K ∩ (K ∗c A)) ∗c A.
∗c-consistency: Since K is consistent, by the definition of ÷c, K ÷c n(A) is
consistent for every A. Given that K ÷cn(A) is consistent and +˙ is consistency-
preserving, it is easy to see that K ÷c n(A)+˙A ⊢  only if A ≡ {⊥}.
∗c-coincidence: Let A ∩K ≠ ∅, B ∩K ≠ ∅ and A ∪K = B ∪K. It follows from
A ∩K ≠ ∅, B ∩K ≠ ∅ and K is consistent that K ÷c n(A) = K = K ÷c n(B).
By Lemma 1, +˙ satisfies +˙-Coincidence. So, K ÷c n(A)+˙A = K ÷c n(B)+˙B, i.e.
K ∗c A =K ∗c B.
∗c-uniformity: Assume (⋆) that it holds for all K ′ ⊆ K that K ′ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢  for
every ϕ ∈ A iff K ′ ∪ {ψ} ⊢  for every ψ ∈ B. By Observation 7, K ∩ (K ∗c A) =
K ÷cn(A) for every A. So, in order to complete the proof, we only need demon-
strate that K∠n(A) =K∠n(B). We need consider two cases. (i) A is empty or
B is empty. Without loss of generality, let A = ∅. Then, it holds vacuously that
∅ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢  for every ϕ ∈ A. So, by (⋆), either B is empty or B ≡ {⊥}, whence
n(B) ≡ {⊺}, i.e. n(B) ≡ n(A). Hence, K∠n(A) = K∠n(B). (ii) A ≠ ∅ and
B ≠ ∅. Then, it follows from (⋆) that for all K ′ ⊆K, K ′ ⊩ n(A) iff K ′ ⊩ n(B).
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So, K∠n(A) =K∠n(B).
∗c-relevance: Let ϕ ∈ K ∖K ∗c A, then K ÷c n(A) ≠ K, i.e. K∠n(A) ≠ ∅. So
there exists X ∈K∠n(A) such that K ÷c A ⊆X and ϕ ∉ X . By Observation 7,
K ∩ (K ∗c A) = K ÷c A, so it follows from K ÷c A ⊆ X that K ∩ (K ∗c A) ⊆ X .
Moreover, it follows from X ∈ K∠n(A) and ϕ ∈ K ∖ X that X ⊮ n(A) and
X ∪ {ϕ} ⊩ n(A), i.e. X ∪ {ψ} ⊬  for some ψ ∈ A and X ∪ {ϕ} ∪ {λ} ⊢  for
every λ ∈ A. Thus, X is the set we are looking for.
From right to left: Let ∗c be some operator satisfying the proposed postu-
lates. Let us define a selection function γ in the following way:
(i) γ(X,Y) =X if Y = ∅.
(ii) If there exist consistent K and finite A such that X = K and Y =K∠n(A)
≠ ∅, then γ(X,Y) = {Y ∈ Y ∣K ∩ (K ∗c A) ⊆ Y }.
(iii) Otherwise, γ(X,Y) = Y.
We need to show that:
(1) γ is well-defined, i.e. if X = Y, then γ(X,X) = γ(X,Y);
(2) γ(X,Y) =X if Y = ∅, which is immediate from the definition;
(3) γ(X,Y) ⊆ Y if Y ≠ ∅, which is also immediate from the definition; and
(4) γ(X,Y) ≠ ∅ if Y ≠ ∅.
For (1), let K be consistent and both A and B be finite sets, and let X = K
and let X = K∠n(A) = K∠n(B) = Y ≠ ∅. Then A ≠ ∅, B ≠ ∅. Moreover,
by Observation 2, it follows that for all K ′ ⊆ K, K ′ ⊮ n(A) iff X ′ ⊮ n(B),
i.e. K ′ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢  for every ϕ ∈ A iff K ′ ∪ {ψ} ⊢  for every ψ ∈ B. So, by
∗c-uniformity, K ∩ (K ∗c A) = K ∩ (K ∗c B). By the definition of γ, it follows
immediately that γ(K,K∠A) = γ(K,K∠B).
For (4), let K be consistent and A be finite, and let K∠n(A) ≠ ∅, we need
to show that γ(K,K∠n(A)) ≠ ∅. It follows from K∠n(A) ≠ ∅ that A ≠ ∅
and A /≡ {⊥}. So, by ∗c-success,K ∗c A ⊢ A and, by ∗c-consistency, K ∗c A is
consistent. It follows that K ∗c A ⊮ n(A) and hence K ∩ (K ∗c A) ⊮ n(A).
So, by Observation 2, there exists K ′ such that K ∩ (K ∗c A) ⊆ K ′ ⊆ K and
K ′ ∈K∠n(A), i.e. γ(K,K∠n(A)) ≠ ∅.
Furthermore, let us define another selection function γ′ in the following way:
(i) γ′(X,Y) =X if Y = ∅.
(ii) If there exist a consistent K and a finite A such that X =K ∩ (K ∗cA) and
Y =X ⋈A ≠ ∅, then γ′(X,Y) = {Y ∈ Y ∣ Y ⊆K ∗c A}.
(iii) If {Y ∈ Y ∣ Y is consistent} ≠ ∅ and there exists no consistent K and finite
A such that X = K ∩ (K ∗c A) and Y = X ⋈ A ≠ ∅, then γ′(X,Y) ∈ {Y ∈ Y ∣
Y is consistent}.
(iv) Otherwise, γ′(X,Y) = Y.
We need show that:
(1′) γ′ is well-defined, i.e. if X = Y, then γ′(X,X) = γ′(X,Y);
(2′) γ′(X,Y) =K if Y = ∅, which is immediate from the definition;
(3′) γ′(X,Y) ⊆ Y if Y ≠ ∅, which is also immediate from the definition;
(4′) γ′(X,Y) ≠ ∅ if Y ≠ ∅; and
(5′) γ′ is ⋈-consistency-preserved, i.e. ⋃γ′(X,Y) is consistent, when there ex-
ists a set A such that Y =X ⋈A and {Y ∈ Y ∣ Y is consistent} ≠ ∅.
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For (1′), let K1 and K2 be consistent, let A and B be finite, and let K =
K1 ∩ (K1 ∗c A) = K2 ∩ (K2 ∗c B) and K ⋈ A = K ⋈ B ≠ ∅, in order to prove
γ′(K,K1 ∩ (K1 ∗c A)) = γ′(K,K2 ∩ (K2 ∗c B)), by the definition of γ′, we only
need to show that K1 ∗c A = K2 ∗c B. There are two cases. (i) A ∩K = ∅.
Then, it follows from K ⋈A =K ⋈B that B ∩K = ∅. By Lemma 1, ∗c satisfies
∗c-vacuity, whence it follows that K ∗c A =K =K ∗cB. Hence, by ∗c-iteration,
K1 ∗c A = K ∗c A = K ∗c B = K2 ∗c B. (ii) A ∩K ≠ ∅. Then it follows from
K ⋈ A = K ⋈ B ≠ ∅ that B ∩ K ≠ ∅ and A ∪ K = B ∪ K. By Lemma 1,
∗c satisfies ∗c-Coincidence. So, K ∗c A = K ∗c B and hence, by ∗c-iteration,
K1 ∗c A =K2 ∗c B.
For (4′), let K be consistent and A be finite, and let (K ∩ (K ∗cA))⋈A ≠ ∅, in
order to complete the proof, it is enough to show thatK∗cA ∈ (K∩(K∗cA))⋈A.
So we only need to show (a)K∗cA ⊆ A∪(K∩(K∗cA)) which is immediate from
∗c-inclusion; (b) (K∩(K∗cA)) ⊆K∗cA which is trivial; and (c) A∩(K∗cA) ≠ ∅.
It follows from (K ∩ (K ∗c A)) ⋈ A ≠ ∅ that A is non-empty. So, (c) follows
immediately from ∗c-success.
As to (5′), let K be consistent and A be finite, and let (K ∩ (K ∗cA))⋈A ≠ ∅.
Moreover, assume that (†) there exists a consistentX ∈ (K∩(K∗cA))⋈A. It has
been shown in the proof for (4′) that it follows that K ∗cA ∈ (K∩(K ∗cA))⋈A.
In order to complete the proof, we only need to show that K ∗c A is consistent.
It follows immediately from (†) that A /≡ {⊥}. So, by ∗c-consistency, K ∗c A is
consistent.
To finish the proof, we need to show that for every consistent K and finite
A,
(⋆) K ∗c A = ⋃γ′(⋂γ(K,K∠n(A)),⋂γ(K,K∠n(A)) ⋈A)) holds.
We first prove that ⋂γ(K,K∠n(A)) =K ∩ (K ∗cA). Let us consider two cases
according to whether K∠n(A) is empty. (i) K∠n(A) = ∅. Then, by the def-
inition of γ, ⋂γ(K,K∠n(A)) = K. Moreover, it follows from K∠n(A) that
A = ∅ or A ≡ {⊥}. If A = ∅, then K ∗c A = K by ∗c-vacuity which ∗c satisfies
according to Lemma 1. If A ≡ {⊥}, then K ∗c A ⊢  by ∗c-success. Moreover,
by Lemma 1, ∗c satisfies ∗c-preservation. It follows that K ⊆K ∗cA. So in each
case it follows that K = K ∩ (K ∗c A), i.e. ⋂γ(K,K∠n(A)) = K ∩ (K ∗c A).
(ii) K∠n(A) ≠ ∅. Then, the from right to left inclusion direction follows imme-
diately from the definition of γ. For the other inclusion direction, suppose that
(‡) there exists ϕ ∉K ∩ (K ∗cA) such that ϕ ∈X for every X ∈ γ(K,K∠n(A)).
It follows immediately that ϕ ∈ K ∖ K ∗c A. So, by ∗c-relevance, there is
K ′ such that K ∩ (K ∗c A) ⊆ K ′ ⊆ K, K ′ ∪ {ψ} ⊬  for some ψ ∈ A and
K ′ ∪ {ϕ} ∪ {λ} ⊢  for every λ ∈ A. Note that A ≠ ∅ since K∠n(A) ≠ ∅.
So, it follows that K ′ ⊮ n(A) and K ′ ∪ {ϕ} ⊩ n(A). So, by Observation 2,
there exists Y such that K ′ ⊆ Y ⊆ K and Y ∈ K∠n(A). Also, it follows from
K ∩ (K ∗c A) ⊆ K ′ ⊆ Y that Y ∈ γ(K,K∠n(A)). Hence, by (‡), ϕ ∈ Y .
However, it follows from K ′ ∪ {ϕ} ⊩ n(A) and K ′ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Y that Y ⊩ n(A)
which contradicts that Y ∈ K∠n(A). Thus, there is no such kind of ϕ, i.e.
⋂γ(K,K∠n(A)) ⊆K ∩ (K ∗c A). So (⋆) holds iff
(⋆⋆) K ∗c A = ⋃γ′(K ∩ (K ∗c A),K ∩ (K ∗c A) ⋈A)) holds.
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As to (⋆⋆), we consider two cases. (i) A = ∅. Then, by ∗c-vacuity, K ∗c A = K
and K ∩ (K ∗c A) ⋈A = ∅. So (⋆⋆) is immediate from the definition of γ′. (ii)
A ≠ ∅. Then, K ∩ (K ∗cA)⋈A ≠ ∅. In this case, as we have shown in the proof
for (4′), K ∗c A ∈ K ∩ (K ∗c A) ⋈ A. So, by the definition of γ′, it holds that
⋃γ′(K∩(K ∗cA),K ∩(K ∗cA)⋈A)) = ⋃{X ∈K∩(K ∗cA)⋈A) ∣X ⊆K ∗cA} =
K ∗c A.
2. From left to right: We only need to check ∗c-redundancy: Assume K ∪Z is
consistent, A /≡ {⊥}, A ≠ ∅ and it holds for every ϕ ∈ Z that ϕ ⊢ ¬ψ for every
ψ ∈ A. We first show that K∠n(A) = (K ∪Z)∠n(A). Since A /≡ {⊥} and A ≠ ∅,
it follows that K∠n(A) ≠ ∅ and (K ∪Z)∠n(A) ≠ ∅. Let X ∈K∠n(A). Then,
X ⊮ n(A) and X ⊆K ⊆ (K ∪Z). Since it holds for every ϕ ∈ Z that ϕ ⊢ ¬ψ for
every ψ ∈ A, it follows that X∪{ϕ} ⊩ n(A) for every ϕ ∈ Z. Moreover, it follows
from X ∈K∠n(A) that X∪{ϕ} ⊩ n(A) for every ϕ ∈K∖X . So X∪{ϕ} ⊩ n(A)
for every ϕ ∈ (K ∪ Z) ∖X . It follows that X ∈ (K ∪ Z)∠n(A). For the other
inclusion direction, let X ∈ (K∪Z)∠n(A). In order to show that X ∈K∠n(A),
it is enough to prove that X ⊆ K, which follows directly from that it holds for
every ϕ ∈ Z that ϕ ⊢ ¬ψ for every ψ ∈ A. So, K∠n(A) = (K ∪ Z)∠n(A) ≠ ∅.
Hence, by Observation 7, it follows that K∩(K ∗cA) = (K∪Z)∩((K∪Z)∗cA).
So, by ∗c-iteration, it follows that K ∗c A = (K ∪Z) ∗c A.
From right to left: Let γ be constructed in the same way as the γ in the proof of
the first part. By observation 4, in order to complete the proof, it is enough to
show that γ is ∠-unified. So, let us suppose (⋆) K1∠n(A) =K2∠n(B) ≠ ∅, we
will prove that K1∩(K1∗cA) =K2∩(K2∗cB). By observation 2, it holds for ev-
ery ϕ ∈K1∖⋃(K1∠n(A)) that ϕ ⊩ n(A). Moreover, it follows fromK1∠n(A) ≠
∅ that A /≡ {⊥} and A ≠ ∅. Hence, by ∗c-redundancy,K1∗cA = (⋃(K1∠n(A))∗c
A. By ∗c-consistency and ∗c-success, it follows from A /≡ {⊥} and A ≠ ∅ that
K1 ∩ (K1 ∗c A) ⊮ n(A). So, by Observation 2, K1 ∩ (K1 ∗c A) ⊆ ⋃(K1∠n(A)).
It follows from this and K1 ∗cA = (⋃(K1∠n(A))∗cA that (a) K1 ∩ (K1 ∗cA) =
(⋃(K1∠n(A))∩((⋃(K1∠n(A))∗cA). It can be obtained by a similar argument
that (b) K2 ∩ (K2 ∗c B) = (⋃(K2∠n(B)) ∩ ((⋃(K2∠n(B)) ∗c B). Let X be
any subset of ⋃(K1∠n(A). By Observation 2, X ⊮ n(A) iff X ⊆ Y for some
Y ∈ K1∠n(A) iff X ⊆ Y for some Y ∈ K2∠n(B) by (⋆) iff X ⊮ n(B). So, by
(⋆) and ∗c-uniformity, (⋃(K1∠n(A)) ∗cA = (⋃(K2∠n(B)) ∗cB and hence (c)
(⋃(K1∠n(A))∩((⋃(K1∠n(A))∗cA) = (⋃(K2∠n(B))∩((⋃(K2∠n(B))∗cB).
It follows from (a), (b) and (c) that K1 ∩ (K1 ∗c A) =K2 ∩ (K2 ∗c B).
Proof for Theorem 5: 1. From left to right: Let ∗c be an external choice revi-
sion, i.e. there exist a partial expansion +˙ and a package contraction ÷p such
that for every sets K and A, K ∗c A =K+˙A ÷p n(A′), where A′ = (K+˙A) ∖K.
∗c-inclusion: By the definition of ∗c and ÷p-inclusion, K∗cA ⊆K+˙A. Moreover,
K+˙A ⊆K ∪A by +˙-inclusion. Thus, K ∗c A ⊆K ∪A.
∗c-success: Let A ≠ ∅, then A ∩ (K+˙A) ≠ ∅ by +˙-success. If A′ = ∅, then
K ∗c A = (K+˙A) ÷p {⊺} =K+˙A. It follows that A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅. If A′ ≠ ∅, by
Observation 9, A′ ⊆ K ∗c A. Moreover, A′ ⊆ A by +˙-inclusion. It follows that
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A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅ holds.
∗c-confirmation: Let (A∩ (K ∗cA) ⊆K. Then, A∩ (K+˙A) ⊆K. It follows that
K+˙A =K. Thus, K ∗c A =K+˙A ÷p A′ =K ÷p {⊺} =K.
∗c-Consistency: Let (K ∗c A) ∖K is non-empty and consistent. By Observa-
tion 9, A′ = (K+˙A) ∖K is non-empty and consistent. It follows that (K+˙A) ⍊
n(A′) ≠ ∅. So K+˙A ÷p n(A′) ⊬ , i.e. K ∗c A is consistent.
∗c-coincidence: Let K ∩A ≠ ∅, K ∩B ≠ ∅ and A ∖K = B ∖K. By Lemma 1,
+˙ satisfies +˙-Coincidence. So, K+˙A = K+˙B. So (K+˙A) ∖K = (K+˙B) ∖K. It
follows that K ∗c A =K ∗c B by the definition of ∗c.
∗c-Uniformity: Assume that (†) K1 ≠ ((K1∗cA)∪K1) =K = ((K2∗cB)∪K2) ≠
K2 and that (‡) it holds for all K ′ ⊆ K that K ′ ∪ ((K1 ∗c A) ∖ K1) ⊢ 
iff K ′ ∪ ((K2 ∗c B) ∖ K2) ⊢ . By Observation 9, it follows from (†) that
K = K1+˙A = K2+˙B. So, in order to prove that K1 ∗c A = K2 ∗c B, we only
need to show that K ⍊ n(A′) = K ⍊ n(B′) where A′ = (K1+˙A) ∖ K1 and
B′ = (K2+˙B) ∖K2. By Observation 9, it follows from (‡) that for all K ′ ⊆ K,
K ′ ∪A′ ⊢  iff K ′ ∪ B′ ⊢ . Moreover, it follows from K1 ≠ ((K1 ∗c A) ∪K1)
and ((K2 ∗c B) ∪K2) ≠ K2 that both A′ and B′ are non-empty. So, it follows
that for all K ′ ⊆K, K ′ ⊢ n(A′) iff K ′ ⊢ n(B′). So, K ⍊ n(A′) =K ⍊ n(B′).
∗c-Relevance: Let ϕ ∈ K ∖K ∗c A, then K+˙A ⍊ n(A′) ≠ ∅. So there exists
X ∈ K+˙A ⍊ n(A′) such that K ∗c A ⊆ X and ϕ ∉ X . We need to show that
(i) X ⊆ K ∪K ∗c A, (ii) X ⊬  and (iii) X ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ . (ii) is immediate from
the definition of package remainder set. For (i) we only need to prove that
K ∪ (K ∗c A) = K+˙A, which is part of Observation 9. For (iii), we first show
that ϕ ∈ K+˙A, which follows immediately from ϕ ∈ K by +˙-preservation. So,
by the definition of package remainder set, X ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ n(A′). By Observation
9, A′ ⊆ K ∗c A. So, it follows from K ∗c A ⊆ X that X ⊩ A′. Moreover, since
(K+˙A) ⍊ n(A′) is not empty, it follows that A′ ≠ ∅. So, X ∪{ϕ} is inconsistent.
From right to left: Let us define a selection function γ in the following way:
(a) γ(K,Y) =K if Y = ∅.
(b) If there exists A such that Y = K ⋈ A ≠ ∅, then γ(K,Y) = {Y ∈ Y ∣ Y ⊆
K ∪ (K ∗c A)}.
(c) Otherwise, γ(K,Y) = Y.
We need to show that:
(1) γ is well-defined, i.e. if X = Y, then γ(K,X) = γ(K,Y);
(2) γ(K,Y) =K if Y = ∅, which is immediate from the definition;
(3) γ(K,Y) ⊆ Y if Y ≠ ∅, which is also immediate from the definition;
(4) γ(K,Y) ≠ ∅ if Y ≠ ∅;
For (1) we only need to show that if K ⋈ A = K ⋈B ≠ ∅, then γ(K,K ⋈A) =
γ(K,K ⋈B). If A∩K = ∅, it is immediate from K ⋈A =K ⋈B that A = B. So
K ∪ (K ∗cA) =K ∪ (K ∗cB), whence γ(K,K ⋈A) = γ(K,K ⋈B). On the other
hand, if A∩K ≠ ∅, then K ∈K ⋈A. So K ∈K ⋈B and hence B ∩K ≠ ∅. More-
over, it follows from K⋈A =K⋈B that K∪A =K∪B. By Lemma 1, ∗c satisfies
K ∗cA ⊆X . So, it holds that K ∗cA =K ∗cB, i.e. K ∪(K ∗cA) =K ∪(K ∗cB),
whence γ(K,K ⋈A) = γ(K,K ⋈B) as well.
For (4), it is enough to show that K∪(K∗cA) ∈K⋈A when K⋈A is non-empty.
22
We need to show (a) K ⊆K ∪(K ∗cA) which is trivial; (b) K∪(K ∗cA) ⊆K ∪A
which is immediate from ∗c-inclusion; and (c) A∩(K ∪(K ∗cA)) ≠ ∅. It follows
from K ⋈A ≠ ∅ that A ≠ ∅. So, by ∗c-success, A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅, whence (c)
follows immediately.
Furthermore, let us define another selection function γ′ in the following way:
(a) γ′(X,Y) =X if Y = ∅.
(b) If there exist K and A such that X =K ∪ (K ∗c A) and Y =X ⍊ n(A′) ≠ ∅
where A′ = (K ∗c A) ∖K, then γ′(X,Y) = {Y ∈ Y ∣K ∗c A ⊆ Y }.
(c) Otherwise, γ′(X,Y) = Y.
We need to show that:
(1′) γ′ is well-defined, i.e. if X = Y, then γ′(K,X) = γ′(K,Y);
(2′) γ′(K,Y) =K if Y = ∅, which is immediate from the definition;
(3′) γ′(K,Y) ⊆ Y if Y ≠ ∅, which is also immediate from the definition;
(4′) γ′(K,Y) ≠ ∅ if Y ≠ ∅;
For (1′), we only consider the principle case, i.e. the case of that X = (K1 ∗c
A) ∪ K1 = (K2 ∗c B) ∪ K2 and Y = X ⍊ n(A′) = X ⍊ n(B′) ≠ ∅ where
A′ = (K1 ∗c A) ∖K1 and B′ = (K2 ∗c B) ∖K2. It follows from X ⍊ n(A′) =
X ⍊ n(B′) ≠ ∅ that A′ ≠ ∅ and B′ ≠ ∅. Moreover, by Observation 1, it follows
from X ⍊ n(A′) = X ⍊ n(B′) that for all X ′ ⊆ X , X ′ ⊬ n(A′) iff X ′ ⊬ n(B′).
So, K1 ≠ ((K1 ∗c A) ∪K1) = X = ((K2 ∗c B) ∪K2) ≠ K2 and it holds for all
X ′ ⊆X that X ′ ∪ ((K1 ∗cA)∖K1) ⊬  iff X ′ ∪ ((K2 ∗cB)∖K2) ⊬ . Hence, by
∗c-Uniformity, K1 ∗c A =K2 ∗c B. Thus, γ′(X,X ⍊ A′) = γ′(X,X ⍊ B′).
For (4′), we only need to show that γ′(K∪(K∗cA),Y) ≠ ∅ when Y = ((K∪(K∗c
A)) ⍊ n(A′)) ≠ ∅ where A′ = (K ∗cA)∖K. We first show that K ∗cA ⊬ n(A′).
It follows immediately from ((K ∪ (K ∗c A)) ⍊ n(A′)) ≠ ∅ that A′ is consis-
tent and non-empty. So, by ∗c-Consistency, K ∗c A is consistent. Moreover,
A′ = ((K ∗c A) ∖K) ⊆ K ∗c A, i.e. K ∗c A ⊩ A′. Hence, K ∗c A ⊬ n(A′). So,
by Observation 1, there exists Y such that K ∗cA ⊆ Y ⊆K∪(K ∗cA) and Y ∈ Y.
To finish the proof, we will prove that
(⋆)K∗cA = ⋂γ′(⋃γ(K,K⋈A), (⋃γ(K,K⋈A)) ⍊ n(A′)), whereA′ = (⋃γ(K,K⋈
A)) ∖K.
Let us consider two cases according to whether A is empty. In the first case,
A = ∅. Then it follows immediately from ∗c-confirmation that K ∗c A = K.
Moreover, by the definitions of those operations in (⋆), it is easy to see that
K = ⋂γ′(⋃γ(K,K ⋈A), (⋃γ(K,K ⋈A)) ⍊ n(A′)) when A = ∅. So (⋆) holds
in this case. In the remaining case, A ≠ ∅. Then, K ⋈A ≠ ∅. As we have shown
in the proof for (4), K ∪ (K ∗cA) ∈K ⋈A when K ⋈A is non-empty. So, by the
definition of γ, (⋆) holds iff
(⋆⋆) K ∗c A = ⋂γ′(K ∪ (K ∗c A), (K ∪ (K ∗c A)) ⍊ n(A′′)) holds, where
A′′ = (K ∗c A) ∖K.
As to (⋆⋆), we also need to consider two cases, according to whether (K∪(K ∗c
A)) ⍊ n(A′′)) is empty. In the first case, (K ∪ (K ∗c A)) ⍊ n(A′′)) = ∅.
Then, it is easy to see that either (i) n(A′′) = ∅ or (ii)A′′ ⊢ . Suppose
(i), it follows immediately that K ∗c A ⊆ K. So, by ∗c-confirmation, it fol-
lows that K ∗c A = K, whence (⋆⋆) follows immediately. Suppose (ii), it
23
follows immediately that K ∗c A is inconsistent. By Lemma 1, ∗c satisfies
∗c-preservation. So, K ⊆ (K ∗c A), i.e. K ∪ (K ∗c A) = K ∗c A. Hence,
⋂γ′(K ∪ (K ∗c A), (K ∪ (K ∗c A)) ⍊ n(A′′)) = ⋂γ′(K ∗c A,∅) = K ∗c A, i.e.
(⋆⋆) holds.
Let us proceed the proof by considering the remaining case that (K∪(K∗cA)) ⍊
n(A′′)) is non-empty. In this case, the from left to right inclusion direction fol-
lows immediately from the clause (b) of the definition of γ′. For the other
inclusion direction, let us suppose towards contradiction that (†) there exists
ϕ ∈ (K∪(K∗cA)) such that ϕ ∉K∗cA but ϕ ∈ ⋂γ′(K∪(K∗cA), (K∪(K∗cA)) ⍊
n(A′′)). It follows from ϕ ∈ (K ∪ (K ∗cA)) and ϕ ∉K ∗cA that ϕ ∈K ∖K ∗cA.
So, by ∗c-Relevance, there is someK
′ with K∗cA ⊆K ′ ⊆K∪(K∗cA), such that
K ′ ⊬  andK ′∪{ϕ} ⊢ . It follows fromK∗cA ⊆K ′ thatK ′ ⊩ A′′. Since A′′ ≠ ∅
and K ′ is consistent, it follows that K ′ ⊬ n(A′′). So, by Observation 1, there
exists X such that K ∗cA ⊆K ′ ⊆X and X ∈ ((K ∪ (K ∗cA)) ⍊ n(A′′)). By the
definition of γ′, it follows that X ∈ γ′(K∪(K∗cA), (K∪(K∗cA)) ⍊ n(A′′)). So,
by (†), ϕ ∈X . However, it follows fromK ′∪{ϕ} ⊢⊥ andK ′ ⊆X thatX∪{ϕ} ⊢⊥,
i.e. X ⊢ , which contradicts that X is contained in a package remainder set.
So, there is no such ϕ, i.e. ⋂γ′(K∪(K ∗cA), (K∪(K ∗cA)) ⍊ n(A′′)) ⊆K ∗cA.
2. From left to right: We only check ∗c-strong Uniformity: Assume that it
holds for all X ⊆ L that X ⊆ K1 ∪ (K1 ∗c A) and X ∪ ((K1 ∗c A) ∖K1) ⊬  iff
X ⊆K2∪(K2 ∗cB) and X ∪((K2 ∗cB)∖K2) ⊬ . Then, by Observations 1 and
9, it follows that (K1+˙A) ⍊ n(A′) = (K2+˙B) ⍊ n(B′) where A′ = (K+˙A) ∖K
and B′ = (K+˙B)∖K. Since ∗c is unified, by the definition of ∗c, it follows that
K1 ∗c A =K2 ∗c B.
From right to left: Let γ′ be defined in the same way as the γ′ in the proof
of the first part. By Observation 4, we only need to prove that γ′ is ⍊-unified.
Let (K1∪(K1∗cA)) ⍊ n(A′) = (K2∪(K2∗cB)) ⍊ n(B′) ≠ ∅, where A′ = (K1∗c
A)∖K1 and B′ = (K2∗cB)∖K2. By Observation 1, it follows that for all X ⊆ L,
X ⊆K1∪(K1∗cA) and X ⊬ n(A′) iff X ⊆K2∪(K2∗cB) and X ⊬ n(B′). More-
over, it follows from (K1∪(K1∗cA)) ⍊ n(A′) = (K2∪(K2∗cB)) ⍊ n(B′) ≠ ∅ that
both A′ and B′ are non-empty. So it follows that for allX ⊆ L,X ⊆K1∪(K1∗cA)
and X∪((K1∗cA)∖K1) ⊬  iff X ⊆K2∪(K2∗cB) and X∪((K2∗cB)∖K2) ⊬ .
So, by ∗c-strong Uniformity, K1 ∗c A = K2 ∗c B. Thus, by the definition of γ′,
it holds that γ′ is ⍊-unified.
Proof for Theorem 6: 1. From left to right: ∗∼-inclusion, ∗∼-success and
∗
∼-consistency follow directly from ∗c-inclusion, ∗c-success and
∗c-consistency (Note that in the proof of Theorem 4, the condition thatK is con-
sistent is not used in checking these three postulates). Moreover, ∗∼-coincidence
follows immediately from Lemma 1 and Theorem 4. So we only supply verifi-
cations for ∗∼-iteration and ∗∼-relevance. Let ∗∼ be an operation of making up
one’s mind, i.e. there exist a choice contraction ÷c and a consistency-preserving
partial expansion +˙ such that K∗∼ϕ =K ÷c n({ϕ,¬ϕ})+˙{ϕ,¬ϕ}.
∗
∼-iteration: It follows directly from the definitions of ÷c and +˙ that K∗
∼
⊺ =
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(K÷c ⊥)∪{⊺}. So (K∗∼⊺)∩K = (K∩(K÷c ⊥))∪(K∩{⊺}) = (K÷c ⊥)∪(K∩{⊺}).
If ⊺ ∈ K, then ⊺ ∈ K÷c ⊥ by the definition of ÷c. So, it always holds that
(K∗∼⊺) ∩K = (K÷c ⊥) ∪ (K ∩ {⊺}) = K÷c ⊥. So, ((K∗∼⊺) ∩K)∗∼ϕ = (K÷c ⊥
)÷c ⊥ +˙{ϕ,¬ϕ} = (K÷c ⊥)+˙{ϕ,¬ϕ} = K ÷c n({ϕ,¬ϕ})+˙{ϕ,¬ϕ} = K∗∼ϕ, i.e. ∗∼-
iteration holds.
∗
∼-relevance: Let ψ ∈K∖K∗∼ϕ, thenK÷cn({ϕ,¬ϕ}) =K÷c ⊥≠K, i.e. K∠ ⊥≠ ∅.
So there exists X ∈ K∠ ⊥ such that K÷c ⊥⊆ X and ψ ∉ X . As shown in
above, it holds that K ∩ (K∗∼⊺) = K÷c ⊥, so it follows from K÷c ⊥⊆ X that
K ∩(K∗∼⊺) ⊆X . Moreover, it follows from X ∈K∠ ⊥ and ψ ∈K ∖X that X ⊮⊥
and X ∪ {ψ} ⊩⊥, i.e. X ⊬  and X ∪ {ψ} ⊬ . Thus, X is just the set we are
looking for.
From right to left: Let us define a selection function γ in the following way:
(i) γ(K,Y) =K if Y = ∅.
(ii) If Y =K∠ ⊥≠ ∅, then γ(K,Y) = {Y ∈ Y ∣K ∩ (K∗∼⊺) ⊆ Y }.
(iii) Otherwise, γ(X,Y) = Y.
It is obvious that:
(1) γ is well-defined, i.e. if X = Y, then γ(K,X) = γ(K,Y), which is immediate
from the definition;
(2) γ(K,Y) =K if Y = ∅, which is also immediate from the definition;
(3) γ(K,Y) ⊆ Y if Y ≠ ∅, which is immediate from the definition again; and
(4) γ(K,Y) ≠ ∅ if Y ≠ ∅, which is immediate from that K ∩ (K∗∼⊺) is consis-
tency due to ∗∼-consistency.
Furthermore, let us define another selection function γ′ in the following way:
(i) γ′(X,Y) =X if Y = ∅.
(ii) If there exist set K and sentence ϕ such that X = K ∩ (K∗∼⊺) and Y =
X ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ}, then γ′(X,Y) = {Y ∈ Y ∣ Y ⊆K∗∼ϕ}.
(iii) If {Y ∈ Y ∣ Y is consistent} ≠ ∅ and there is no set K and sentence ϕ
such that X = K ∩ (K∗∼⊺) and Y = X ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ}, then γ′(X,Y) ∈ {Y ∈ Y ∣
Y is consistent}.
(iv) Otherwise, γ′(X,Y) = Y.
We need to show that:
(1′) γ′ is well-defined, i.e. if X = Y, then γ′(X,X) = γ′(X,Y);
(2′) γ′(X,Y) =K if Y = ∅, which is immediate from the definition;
(3′) γ′(X,Y) ⊆ Y if Y ≠ ∅, which is also immediate from the definition;
(4′) γ′(X,Y) ≠ ∅ if Y ≠ ∅; and
(5′) γ′ is ⋈-consistency-preserved, i.e. ⋃γ′(X,Y) is consistent, if there exists a
set A such that Y =X ⋈A and {Y ∈ Y ∣ Y is consistent} ≠ ∅.
For (1′), let X = K1 ∩ (K1∗∼⊺) = K2 ∩ (K2∗∼⊺) and X ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ} = X ⋈ {ψ,¬ψ}.
We should consider two cases. (i) X ∩ {ϕ,¬ϕ} ≠ ∅. Then, it follows that
X ∩ {ψ,¬ψ} ≠ ∅. Moreover, it follows from X ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ} = X ⋈ {ψ,¬ψ} that
X ∪ {ϕ,¬ϕ} = X ∪ {ψ,¬ψ}. By ∗∼-consistency, X ⊬ . So, by ∗∼-coincidence,
X∗∼ϕ = X∗∼ψ and hence, by ∗∼-iteration, K1∗∼ϕ = K2∗∼ψ. (ii) X ∩ {ϕ,¬ϕ} = ∅.
Then, it follows immediately that ϕ is identical to ψ. So, by ∗∼-iteration, it
follows from K1 ∩ (K1∗∼⊺) = K2 ∩ (K2∗∼⊺) that K1∗∼ϕ = (K1 ∩ (K1∗∼⊺))∗∼ϕ =
(K2 ∩ (K2∗∼⊺))∗∼ψ =K2∗∼ψ. Thus, in each case, γ′(X,X) = γ′(X,Y).
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For (4′), it is enough to show thatK∗∼ϕ ∈ ((K∩(K∗∼⊺))⋈{ϕ,¬ϕ)}. So we should
show (a) K∗∼ϕ ⊆ (K ∩ (K∗∼⊺)) ∪ {ϕ,¬ϕ} which is immediate from ∗∼-inclusion
and ∗∼-iteration; (b) (K ∩ (K∗∼⊺)) ⊆ K∗∼ϕ; and (c) {ϕ,¬ϕ} ∩ (K∗∼ϕ) ≠ ∅ which
is immediate from ∗∼-success. For (b), by ∗∼-iteration, we only need to show
(K ∩ (K∗∼⊺)) ⊆ (K ∩ (K∗∼⊺))∗∼ϕ. By ∗∼-consistency, K ∩ (K∗∼⊺) ⊬ . So, by
∗
∼-relevance, there is no ψ ∈ (K ∩(K∗∼⊺))∖(K ∩(K∗∼⊺))∗∼ϕ, i.e. (K ∩(K∗∼⊺)) ⊆
(K ∩ (K∗∼⊺))∗∼ϕ.
As to (5′), we only need to show that K∗∼ϕ is consistent for every ϕ, which is
confirmed by ∗∼-consistency.
To finish the proof, we need to show that for every set K and sentence ϕ, it
holds that
(⋆) K∗∼ϕ = ⋃γ′(⋂γ(K,K∠n({ϕ,¬ϕ})),⋂γ(K,K∠n({ϕ,¬ϕ}))⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ})).
We first prove that ⋂γ(K,K∠n({ϕ,¬ϕ})) =K ∩ (K∗∼⊺). It is easy to see that
K∠n({ϕ,¬ϕ}) = K∠ ⊥. So, the from right to left inclusion direction follows
immediately from the clause (ii) of the definition of γ. For the other inclusion
direction, suppose (†) there exists ψ ∉K ∩ (K∗∼⊺) such that ψ ∈ ⋂γ(K,K∠ ⊥).
It follows from the definition of γ that ψ ∈K∖K∗∼⊺. So, by ∗∼-relevance, there is
K ′ such that K ∩ (K∗∼⊺) ⊆K ′ ⊆K, K ′ ⊬  and K ′ ∪ {ψ} ⊢  . So, by Observa-
tion 2, there exists Y such that K ′ ⊆ Y ⊆K and Y ∈K∠ ⊥. Also, it follows from
K ∩ (K∗∼⊺) ⊆ K ′ ⊆ Y that Y ∈ γ(K,K∠ ⊥). Hence, by (†), ψ ∈ Y . However, it
follows from K ′ ∪ {ψ} ⊢  and K ′ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ Y that Y ⊢ , which contradicts that
Y ∈K∠ ⊥. Thus, there is no such kind of ψ, i.e. ⋂γ(K,K∠ ⊥) ⊆K ∩ (K∗∼⊺).
So (⋆) holds iff
(⋆⋆) K∗∼ϕ = ⋃γ′(K ∩ (K∗∼⊺), (K ∩ (K∗∼⊺)) ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ}) holds.
As we have shown in the proof for (4′), K∗∼ϕ ∈ (K∩(K∗∼⊺))⋈{ϕ,¬ϕ}. So, (⋆⋆)
follows immediately from the definition of γ′.
2. From left to right: We only need to check ∗∼-redundancy: Let Z ≡ {⊥}.
It is easy to see that K ÷c n({ϕ,¬ϕ}) = K ÷c {⊥} for every K and ϕ. So
K∗∼ϕ =K÷cn({ϕ,¬ϕ})+˙{ϕ,¬ϕ} =K÷c{⊥}+˙{ϕ,¬ϕ} = (K∪Z)÷c{⊥}+˙{ϕ,¬ϕ} =
(K ∪Z) ÷c {ϕ,¬ϕ}+˙{ϕ,¬ϕ} = (K ∪Z)∗∼ϕ.
From right to left: Let γ be constructed in the same way as the γ in the
proof of the first part. By observation 4, in order to complete the proof, it
is enough to show that γ is ∠-unified. Assume K1∠ ⊥= K2∠ ⊥≠ ∅, we need
to prove that K1 ∩ (K1 ∗c ⊺) = K2 ∩ (K2 ∗c ⊺). By observation 2, it holds for
every ϕ ∈ K1 ∖⋃(K1∠ ⊥) that ϕ ⊩⊥, i.e. (K1 ∖⋃(K1∠ ⊥)) ≡ {⊥}. Hence, by
∗c-redundancy, K1 ∗c ⊺ = ⋃(K1∠ ⊥)∗c ⊺. By ∗∼-consistency, K1 ∩ (K1 ∗c ⊺) ⊬ 
and hence K1 ∩ (K1 ∗c ⊺) ⊆ ⋃(K1∠ ⊥) by Observation 2. It follows this and
K1 ∗c⊺ = ⋃(K1∠ ⊥)∗c ⊺ that K1∩(K1 ∗c ⊺) = (⋃(K1∠ ⊥)∩((⋃(K1∠ ⊥)∗c ⊺).
By a similar argument, it can be obtained that K2 ∩ (K2 ∗c ⊺) = (⋃(K2∠ ⊥
) ∩ ((⋃(K2∠ ⊥) ∗c ⊺). Moreover, it follows from K1∠ ⊥= K2∠ ⊥≠ ∅ that
(⋃(K1∠ ⊥) = (⋃(K2∠ ⊥). So, K1 ∩ (K1 ∗c ⊺) =K2 ∩ (K2 ∗c ⊺).
Proof for Theorem 7: 1. From left to right: It follows immediately from Lemma
1 and Theorem 5.
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From right to left: Let us define a selection function γ in the following way:
(a) γ(K,Y) =K if Y = ∅.
(b) If there exists ϕ such that Y = K ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ}, then γ(K,Y) = {Y ∈ Y ∣ Y ⊆
K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ)}.
(c) Otherwise, γ(K,Y) = Y.
We need to show that:
(1) γ is well-defined, i.e. if X = Y, then γ(K,X) = γ(K,Y);
(2) γ(K,Y) =K if Y = ∅, which is immediate from the definition;
(3) γ(K,Y) ⊆ Y if Y ≠ ∅, which is also immediate from the definition;
(4) γ(K,Y) ≠ ∅ if Y ≠ ∅;
For (1) we only need to show that if K ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ} =K ⋈ {ψ,¬ψ}, then γ(K,K ⋈
{ϕ,¬ϕ}) = γ(K,K ⋈ {ψ,¬ψ}). If {ϕ,¬ϕ} ∩ K = ∅, it is immediate from
K ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ} = K ⋈ {ψ,¬ψ} that ϕ = ψ. So K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ) = K ∪ (K∗∼ψ), whence
γ(K,K ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ}) = γ(K,K ⋈ {ψ,¬ψ}). On the other hand, if {ϕ,¬ϕ}∩K ≠ ∅,
thenK ∈K⋈{ϕ,¬ϕ}. So K ∈K⋈{ψ,¬ψ} and hence {ψ,¬ψ}∩K ≠ ∅. Moreover,
it follows from K ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ} =K ⋈ {ψ,¬ψ} that K ∪ {ϕ,¬ϕ} =K ∪ {ψ,¬ψ}. So,
by ∗c-coincidence, it holds that K∗
∼ϕ = K∗∼ψ, i.e. K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ) = K ∪ (K∗∼ψ),
whence γ(K,K ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ}) = γ(K,K ⋈ {ψ,¬ψ}) as well.
For (4), it is enough to show that K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ) ∈K ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ}. This follows from
that (a) K ⊆ K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ) which is trivial; (b) K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ) ⊆ K ∪ {ϕ,¬ϕ} which
is immediate from ∗∼-inclusion; and (c) {ϕ,¬ϕ} ∩ (K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ)) ≠ ∅ which is
immediate from ∗∼-success.
Furthermore, let us define another selection function γ′ in the following way:
(a) γ′(X,Y) =X if Y = ∅.
(b) If there exists K and ϕ such that X = K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ) and Y = X ⍊ n(A′) ≠ ∅
where A′ = (K∗∼ϕ) ∖K, then γ′(X,Y) = {Y ∈ Y ∣K∗∼ϕ ⊆ Y }.
(c) Otherwise, γ′(X,Y) = Y.
We need to show that:
(1′) γ′ is well-defined, i.e. the case of X = Y, then γ′(K,X) = γ′(K,Y);
(2′) γ′(K,Y) =K if Y = ∅, which is immediate from the definition;
(3′) γ′(K,Y) ⊆ Y if Y ≠ ∅, which is also immediate from the definition;
(4′) γ′(K,Y) ≠ ∅ if Y ≠ ∅;
For (1′), we only consider the principle case, i.e. let X = (K1∗∼ϕ) ∪ K1 =
(K2∗∼ψ) ∪K2 and X ⍊ n(A′) = X ⍊ n(B′) ≠ ∅ where A′ = (K1∗∼ϕ) ∖K1 and
B′ = (K2∗∼ψ)∖K2. It follows from X ⍊ n(A′) =X ⍊ n(B′) ≠ ∅ that A′ ≠ ∅ and
B′ ≠ ∅. Moreover, by Observation 1, it follows from X ⍊ n(A′) = X ⍊ n(B′)
that for all X ′ ⊆ X , X ′ ⊬ n(A′) iff X ′ ⊬ n(B′). So, K1 ≠ ((K1∗∼ϕ) ∪K1) = X =
((K2∗∼ψ) ∪K2) ≠ K2 and it holds for all X ′ ⊆ X that X ′ ∪ ((K1∗∼ϕ) ∖K1) ⊬ 
iff X ′ ∪ ((K2∗∼ψ) ∖K2) ⊬ . Hence, by ∗∼-Uniformity, K1∗∼ϕ = K2∗∼ψ. Thus,
γ′(X,X ⍊ A′) = γ′(X,X ⍊ B′).
For (4′), we only need to show that γ′(K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ),Y) ≠ ∅ when Y = ((K ∪
(K∗∼ϕ)) ⍊ n(A′)) ≠ ∅ where A′ = (K∗∼ϕ)∖K. We first show that K∗∼ϕ ⊬ n(A′).
It follows from ((K∪(K∗∼ϕ)) ⍊ n(A′)) ≠ ∅ that A′ is consistent and non-empty.
So, by ∗∼-Consistency, K∗∼ϕ is consistent. Moreover, A′ = ((K∗∼ϕ) ∖K) ⊆K∗∼ϕ,
i.e. K∗∼ϕ ⊩ A′. Hence, K∗∼ϕ ⊬ n(A′). So, by Observation 1, there exists Y such
that K∗∼ϕ ⊆ Y ⊆K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ) and Y ∈ Y.
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To complete the proof, we will show it holds that
(⋆) K∗∼ϕ = ⋂γ′(⋃γ(K,K ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ}), (⋃γ(K,K ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ})) ⍊ n(A′)), where
A′ = (⋃γ(K,K ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ})) ∖K.
As we have shown in the proof for (4), K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ) ∈ K ⋈ {ϕ,¬ϕ}, so, by the
definition of γ, (⋆) holds iff
(⋆⋆) K∗∼ϕ = ⋂γ′(K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ), (K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ)) ⍊ n(A′′)) holds, where A′′ =
(K∗∼ϕ) ∖K.
As to (⋆⋆), we need to consider two cases, according to whether (K∪(K∗∼ϕ)) ⍊
n(A′′)) is empty. In the first case, (K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ)) ⍊ n(A′′)) = ∅. Then, it is easy
to see that either (i) n(A′′) = ∅ or (ii)A′′ is inconsistent. Suppose (i), it follows
immediately that K∗∼ϕ ⊆ K. So, by ∗∼-confirmation, it follows that K∗∼ϕ = K,
whence (⋆⋆) follows immediately. Suppose (ii), it follows immediately thatK∗∼ϕ
is inconsistent. So, by ∗∼-Relevance, K ⊆ (K∗∼ϕ), i.e. K∪(K∗∼ϕ) =K∗∼ϕ. Hence,
(⋆⋆) follows from the definition γ′.
Let us proceed the proof by considering the remaining case that
(K∪(K∗∼ϕ)) ⍊ n(A′′)) is non-empty. In this case, the from left to right inclusion
direction follows immediately from the clause (b) of the definition of γ′. For the
other inclusion direction, let us suppose towards contradiction that (†) there ex-
ists ψ ∈ (K∪(K∗∼ϕ)) such that ψ ∉K∗∼ϕ but ψ⋂ ∈ γ′(K∪(K∗∼ϕ), (K∪(K∗∼ϕ)) ⍊
n(A′′)). It follows from ϕ ∈ (K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ)) and ϕ ∉ K∗∼ϕ that ϕ ∈ K ∖K∗∼ϕ.
So, by ∗∼-Relevance, there is some K ′ with K∗∼ϕ ⊆ K ′ ⊆ K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ) such that
K ′ ⊬  and K ′ ∪ {ψ} ⊢ . It follows from K∗∼ϕ ⊆ K ′ that K ′ ⊩ A′′. Since
A′′ ≠ ∅ and K ′ is consistent, it follows that K ′ ⊬ n(A′′). So, by Observation
1, there exists X with K∗∼ϕ ⊆ K ′ ⊆ X such that X ∈ (K ∪ (K ∗c A)) ⍊ n(A′′),
and hence X ∈ γ′(K ∪ (K ∗c A), (K ∪ (K ∗c A)) ⍊ n(A′′)). So, by (†), ψ ∈ X .
However, it follows from K ′ ⊆X and K ′ ∪ {ψ} ⊢⊥ that X ∪ {ψ} ⊢⊥, i.e. X ⊢ ,
which contradicts that X belongs to a package remainder set. So, there is no
such ψ, i.e. ⋂γ′(K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ), (K ∪ (K∗∼ϕ)) ⍊ n(A′′)) ⊆K∗∼ϕ.
2. From left to right: We only check ∗∼-strong Uniformity: Assume it holds for
all X ⊆ L that X ⊆K1∪(K1∗∼ϕ) and X∪((K1∗∼ϕ)∖K1) ⊬  iffX ⊆K2∪(K2∗∼ψ)
and X ∪ ((K2∗∼ψ) ∖K2) ⊬ . Then, by Observations 1 and 9, it follows that
(K1+˙{ϕ,¬ϕ}) ⍊ n(A′) = (K2+˙{ψ,¬ψ}) ⍊ n(B′) where A′ = (K+˙{ϕ,¬ϕ}) ∖K
and B′ = (K+˙{ψ,¬ψ})∖K. Since ∗∼ is unified, by the definition of ∗∼, it follows
that K1∗
∼ϕ =K2∗∼ψ.
From right to left: Let γ′ be defined in the same way as the γ′ in the proof
of the first part. To finish the proof, by Observation 4, we only need to prove
that γ′ is ⍊-unified. Let (K1 ∪ (K1∗∼ϕ)) ⍊ n(A′) = (K2 ∪ (K2∗∼ψ)) ⍊ n(B′) ≠ ∅,
whereA′ = (K1∗∼ϕ)∖K1 and B′ = (K2∗∼ψ)∖K2. By Observation 1, it follows that
it holds for all X ⊆ L, X ⊆K1∪(K1∗∼ϕ) and X ⊬ n(A′) iff X ⊆K2∪(K2∗∼ψ) and
X ⊬ n(B′). Moreover, it follows from (K1∪(K1∗∼ϕ)) ⍊ n(A′) = (K2∪(K2∗∼ψ)) ⍊
n(B′) ≠ ∅ that both A′ and B′ are non-empty. So it follows that for all X ⊆ L,
X ⊆ K1 ∪ (K1∗∼ϕ) and X ∪ ((K1∗∼ϕ) ∖ K1) ⊬  iff X ⊆ K2 ∪ (K2∗∼ψ) and
X ∪ ((K2∗∼ψ)∖K2) ⊬ . So, by ∗c-strong Uniformity, K1∗∼ϕ =K2∗∼ψ. Thus, by
the definition of γ′, it holds that γ′ is ⍊-unified.
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